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1.?Preface
 Many “soft” factors are considered in the process of sentencing, and 
they can be separated into two large groups; the first is the factors 
surrounding the severity of the criminal conduct itself, and the second is 
the circumstances surrounding the perpetrator. The second group is 
usually regarded, at least in Japan, as something based on general 
prevention or special prevention.
 The same could be said for the Spilraumteorie of German theories2, 
which Japanese law frequent ly re ferences3 . Br ie f ly expla ined, 
Spilraumteorie is a theory which suggests that the standard by which 
penalties are determined is indicated within a specific scope, and within 
that scope, mitigating circumstances?especially those that satisfy general 
and special prevention?must be considered.
 However, Spilraumteorie is inevitably a theory that is lacking in the 
clarification of sentencing standards. The first reason is because of the 
premise of Spilraumteorie; it is based upon the volatility of the sentencing 
standard. In a way, it is a contradiction to call this a “standard.” Secondly, 
the details about the consideration of prevention methods is very vague. 
From the perspective of criminology theories, nothing has been 
empirically tested to prove this as a reputable theory. Since this is an 
unproven theory, making it a standard equates any discussion using this 
theory as something based on impression. We seek to know the extent to 
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2 Bruns ?1985? s. 105 ff.
3 See, Shiroshita ?2010? p. 243.
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which a sentence can influence prevention, but achieving that is 
impossible without concrete data. 
 What is really in need are the two of the following theories; first, a 
theory that allows sentencing?proportionate to the gravity of the crime?to 
be judged within a certain scope, and second, a theory that does not 
consider prevention in sentencing.
 Theories that include both of these already exist in Anglo-American 
Law; a sentencing theory based on the principle of proportionality. I 
believe sentencing theories based on the principle of proportionality to be 
the most effective, even when compared with all other existing theories
?this theory has been refined and reconstructed by Andreas von Hirsch4 
etc.?.
 So the question is, if we were to utilize the principle of proportionality, 
does that mean that keeping penalties proportionate to the crime becomes 
the sole sentencing standard? If this were to be true, I believe the 
sentencing will become too rigid. For instance, is it acceptable to equate a 
situation where compensation is possible with one where it is impossible? 
Is it acceptable to consider a situation where the defendant shows 
remorse, the same as one where none is shown? Is it acceptable to treat a 
first offender with the same consideration as a repeated offender? The 
consequences are endless.
 In this case, it becomes necessary to consider the circumstances of 
these people with a more practical approach in sentencing.
 However, another problem arises. Where is the basis that makes the 
consideration of these circumstances possible, when the principle of 
proportionality fundamentally rejects the consideration of prevention? If 
th i s remains unso lved , i t w i l l poss ib ly render the pr inc ip le o f 
proportionality to a theory “that is looks great on paper but not practical” 
no matter how superior the principle itself makes itself out to be.
2.?Which factors are important in sentencing?
 It could be safely assumed that similar circumstances are considered 
in sentencing processes in any country. It is easy to simply call this 
“common sense.” However it is necessary to theoretically analyze the true 
4 For example, v Hirsch ?2017?.
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implications within these circumstances.
 Let us look at what types of circumstances could potentially exist:
?Existing criminal records
?The defendant’s age and health
?The defendant’s degree of remorse or admission
?When the defendant is largely disadvantaged by his or her own doings
?When the defendant is already subject to other societal punishments 
?When some time has already passed from the date of the criminal act
 The inclination to consider these circumstances is most likely shared 
between all countries. The real problem is, why these are able to become 
the foundation of sentencing principles.
 As said before, in many cases in Japan and Germany, the above 
problems has been assessed from the viewpoints of general prevention 
and special prevention; but is it really appropriate to explain this problem 
from a prevention-based view?
 In evaluating this problem, let us say that it is possible to explain the 
a b o v e c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f 
proportionality, or that it is more appropriate to explain these form 
perspectives other than prevention. In other words, it is possible to make 
practical and appropriate sentencing without considering prevention, and it 
is possible to make this a rationale for sentencing. If it were that these 
were indeed possible, it could be predicted that the result would be that 
there is no room for Spilraumteorie.
3.?Humanity - a fundamental viewpoint
 The Swedish legal system has already solved the problems we face5. 
Swedish criminal law provides provisions for sentencing standards that are 
based on the principle of proportionality?BrB chap. 29. art. 1, 2.?, and as a 
principle to practically adjust the achieved results, there are also 
provisions that lessen the severity of sentencing for individual cases. 
These provisions are said to be rooted from “equity reasons.”
 As a fundamental rule, Swedish criminal law proportionally penalizes 
criminals based on the penal value?“strafvärde”?of their crime. After 
sentencing, these penalties are readjusted by the above “equity reasons.”
5 Cf. v Hirsch & Jareborg ?2009?.
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 According to Nils Jareborg and Josef Zila, equity reasons are 
formulated from justice6. Some examples of justice are humanity, respect, 
sympathy, acceptance an its values7.
 What become interesting is the relationship between humanity and the 
principle of proportionality. These questions arise because, if we were to 
formally carry through the principle of proportionality, it seems as if there 
is no space for the consideration of humanity.
 In 2015, Jack Ågren published a detailed research report on the above 
relationship8. According to Ågren, the foundation upon which the principle 
of proportionality stands is the realization of justice, and hence the 
consideration of “equity reasons,” which is consistent with justice, does 
not clash with the fundamental structure of the principle of proportionality, 
but it allows for further development. If the principle of proportionality is 
derived from the fundamental principle of the realization of justice, it 
should not contradict “equity reasons” as this i also derived from the same 
fundamental principle.
 Adding on to what Nils Jareborg and Josef Zila has already proposed, 
Ågren sought to make a more detailed explanation of humanity9. In other 
words, the concept of “humanity” is unique to Swedish law, and is also a 
key concept in explaining “equity reasons. However, the word “humanity” 
makes an impression consistent with the generally accepted meaning of it, 
despite its ties with the criminal jurisprudence world, and for these 
reasons some people are not enthusiastic about theoretically including this 
concept in penal theories. In contrary to these opinions, “humanity” 
became a fundamental principle in Swedish criminal law after its reform in 
1864. To this day, it is a comprehensive principle in penal theories and is 
regarded as an important authority. Ågren asserts that “humanity” is an 
understanding of others and others’ situations and implies acceptance and 
dignity. It exists in many forms in order to achieve the goals of acceptance 
and dignity. 
 With these viewpoints in mind, I would like to closely examine the 
above circumstances in the next chapter.
6 Jareborg & Zila ?2007? p. 129.
7 About these ideas, see, Jareborg & Zila ?2007? p. 91 ff. 
8 Ågren ?2013?.
9 Ågren ?2013? s. 86 f.
Using Equity Reasons To Evaluate Mitigating Circumstances 5
4.?Existing criminal records
 A sentence is usually more severe when the defendant has a criminal 
record. This is a strong factor that is backed by a strong sense of 
conviction, since it is a result that naturally comes with the sentiments of 
the general public. Take this for an example; let us say we are disciplining 
child. Generally we are more forgiving when the child makes a certain 
mistake for the first time, and let them go; the second time, we may make 
them write a letter of apology; from the third time and onwards, we may 
stop their monthly allowance.
 These actions are generally accepted as a normal way to discipline a 
child, but it is difficult to justify them from the principle of proportionality. 
The principle of proportionality calls for penalties that are proportional to 
the severity of the crime committed, and it is common to think that as long 
as the crime is the same, the same penalty will be placed regardless of how 
many times it has been committed. In Sweden, where sentencing 
provisions are based on the principle of proportionality, it is said that the 
defendants’ criminal records are not really considered in the process of 
sentencing?there are, however, provisions that allow to “add-on” the 
severity of penalties; ref. BrB chap. 29, art. 4.?. Special prevention provides 
a simpler explanation; in other words, repeated offenders have dangerous 
personalities, or are people who need to be heavily penalized in order to 
stop them from repeating the offense?s?and thus the demand for special 
prevention is high which leads to heavier penalties. 
 It is possible to explain this situation through the principle of 
proportionality as well. The crime, for which the defendant is to be 
punished, not only includes the wrongness of the crime, but also the 
gravity of responsibility and blameworthiness. If one were to have more 
blame, it is appropriate to regard the crime as graver than it was before.
 There is another explanat ion through this pr inc ip le . I f the 
consequences after the third offense is more severe than after the second 
offense, the second after the first, it can be said that the consequences 
after the first offense is lighter than after the second offense and the same 
appl ies for the second and th ird . In o ther words , the i f penal ty 
proportionate to the crime should be based on the third offense, but by 
lessening the intensity of the intensity from the third to second, second to 
6 Waseda Bulletin of Comparative Law Vol. 36
first, we could claim that we are treating the defendant with humanity. We 
could say that criminal records do not necessarily increase the intensity of 
penalties, but it may serve as a circumstance that alleviates, in part, the 
intensity of the penalty.
 The special prevention explanation is unnecessary if it were acceptable 
to think in this way. Again, the special prevention explanation is appealing, 
but there is no objective data to allow to measure the intensity of the 
penalty that will prevent the defendant from committing further crimes or 
repeating them. Everything is determined through subjectivity, or feeling. 
Additionally, even if we were to consistently double the intensity of the 
penalty every time a crime is repeated, that still does not make it a 
component of special prevention. The requirements of special prevention 
differs from every case and cannot be dependent upon a consistent rule 
like above. Special prevention can only be justified through the principle of 
proportionality. 
5.? The defendant’s degree of remorse or admission
?1?  Preventative measures to localize damage and damage 
compensation
 How much remorse a defendant shows is an important factor in 
sentencing. More specifically, such remorse is shown through measures to 
prevent further damage and how much damage compensation is offered. 
In Japan, in order for these circumstances to be considered, there are 
three types of justifications; ?a?it is explained through responsibility, ?b?it 
is explained through prevention, or ?c?it is explained through a third party 
independent form responsibility or prevention. Since option?b?is not 
compatible with the premise of the principle of proportionality, let us start 
with the explanation for option?a?.
 Ågren explains his theory from option?a?10. He claims that actions to 
prevent further damage from a certain crime is deserving of a lighter 
penalty, and therefore the level of blame towards the defendant is also 
lightened. The premise for this claim is that the principle of proportionality 
is interpreted more broadly to include factors that are outside the scope of 
the consequences of the crime in question. With this explanation in hand, 
10 Ågren ?2013? s. 138 ff.
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whether the post-crime activities had the effect of reviving or repairing 
damages becomes a very important factor and whether the offender had 
regret or remorse and other moral emotions becomes irrelevant. 
 Ågren’s theory seems like it is trying to revise the interpretation of a 
criminal act itself. If it were so, the prevention of the harmful effects of 
crime becomes an obsolete explanation, since this does not affect the penal 
value of a premise that requires a completed criminal act. However, 
Ågren’s theory probably does not deal with these explanations. What he 
was trying to say is, even if the prevention of the harmful effect of crime is 
executed, this does not change the penal value of an already committed 
crime, but by the defendant executing these actions, it lessens the need to 
give a culpability sentence proportionate to the penal value of the crime. In 
other words, if the offender’s criminal acts were interpreted broadly
?including the time immediately before and after the crime itself?, the 
penalty that seems appropriate to the penal values loses its proportionality.
 Ågren’s theory deftly steers away from having to explain special 
prevention, which is rejected by the principle of proportionality. However, 
it is quite questionable; ?1?Does the fact that remorse, regret and other 
moral emotions are not considered a viable result that could be accepted? 
?2?Is not not true that no matter what theoretical structure is used, 
making the defendant’s behavior?including those immediately before and 
after the crime?and the penalty proportionate to each other is not 
something that is included in the definition of proportionality in the 
principle of proportionality?
 Truthfully, question?2?requires Option?c?explained through a third 
party independent form responsibility or prevention?. Namely, these kind 
of circumstances are consistent with the goals of criminal policy. In the 
case of criminal theory in continental law, it may be explained that 
Strafbarkeit and Strafwürdigkeit will both disappear. 
?2? Surrender
 A sentence becomes lighter if an offender surrenders or admits his or 
her crime?s?. Ågren gives the same explanation11 as above, for the 
justification of this case.
11 Ågren ?2013? s. 158.
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 In Japan, there is a legal provision that accepts surrender as a 
circumstance to be considered to lighten a penalty. Its justification can be 
proven through policy and the lessening of culpability, but, as with Ågren, 
it is most appropriate to say that the blameworthiness is lightened. From 
this, Strafbarkeit and Strafwürdigkeit also deceased in intensity. 
 Subsequently, if provisions like Japan were placed, where a penalty will 
be lightened if one surrenders, it could be predicted that more people will 
admit to their crimes in hopes of a lightened penalty. In this sense, it is 
possible to justify these circumstances being included in provisions as a 
general considerations through the rationality of criminal policy. With 
these provisions, the efficiency of the prevention of further harmful effects 
by crime and criminal legislation will undoubtedly be addressed, and for 
this reason, the assertion that the advantages of these policies will be 
reflected in sentencing and subsequently seek to achieve the realization of 
these advantages is plausible as an example of justification to include these 
circumstances as a determining factor of sentencing.
6.? When the defendant is largely disadvantaged by 
his or her own doings
 A characteristic example of the defendant largely disadvantaged by his 
or her own doings is when one is severely injured?physically?. It is 
possible, in this case, for the inflicted injuries to be personal responsibility. 
However, in the long run, comparing those who actually got injured versus 
those who did not, it is clear the the former tends to be regarded as a 
harsher consequence. In reality, these types of circumstances are 
interpreted as a sentencing factor in most cases.
 Ågren, from the viewpoint of the former, bring up “humanity” as its 
justification12. Humanity should be understood as a moral philosophy and 
fundamentally calls for respect for the individual that is stresses the value 
of the independent individual. It does not imply that anyone should not be 
rejected from the concept of “humanity.” Generally, there are no criticism 
towards the claims that protect the victim’s rights, but the offender is as 
human as the victim is and should be respected as a human being as well.
 In Japan, severe physical injuries tend to influence a sentencing to be 
12 Ågren ?2013? s. 107 ff.
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of a lighter degree. Again, there are three types of justifications; ?a?it is 
explained through responsibility, ?b?it is explained through prevention, or 
?c?it is explained through a third party independent form responsibility or 
prevention. Swedish criminal law theorists including Ågren may be 
categorized to take the perspective of option?c?.
 Yuji Shiroshita, who takes option?b?, criticizes that “implementing 
viewpoints other than ‘responsibility’ and ‘prevention’ as the foundation of 
sentencing factors must be carefully considered, as it translates to the 
acceptance of the new penal theory that is nearly equivalent in prominence 
with existing penal theories regarding the justification of penalties.”13 
However, it is possible to consider humanity?as part of justice?without 
clashing with the principle of proportionality, since the very root of the 
principle of proportionality is the realization of justice. It is possible to 
theoretically and logically explain the mitigation of the sentence in the 
case of the defendant being subject to disadvantages. 
7.?The defendant’s age, health, and occupation
 If the defendant is of old age and/or in poor health, these are usually 
considered mitigating circumstances in sentencing. In Japan, old age is an 
advantageous factor because special prevention includes the protection of 
the elderly and the same applies to poor health because it may exacerbate 
the suffering in prison or require consideration of treatment and these are 
factors of special prevention. In both cases, concluding that they are 
advantageous because they are part of special prevention is questionable 
as an explanation, since the goals of special prevention is reformation and 
rehabilitation.
 Ågren analyzes old age and poor health as categories for defendants, 
but should be mitigating circumstances from the perspective of 
humanity14. Compared with those who are younger and healthier, those 
who are of old age and poor health will experience more suffering even 
with the same penalty, and therefore should mitigate the penalty for 
humane reasons.
13 Shiroshita ?2009? p. 74 f.
14 Ågren ?2013? s. 129.
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8. ? When the defendant is already subject to other 
societal punishments 
 In many cases, being already subject to other societal punishments is 
considered in sentencing, such as when one is laid off of a job. 
 Ågren claims that this holds a double-layered personality to it and 
should be implemented for the sake of humanity15. 
 In Japan, many interpret this as independent of responsibility and 
prevention. For example, many stand for the neutral adjustment principle 
with neutral values and argue that by receiving a certain type of 
punishment, the need for retributive penalties is clearly diminished.
 These explanations, which can be inferred from previous ones, is 
consistent with the principle of proportionality. Explaining this 
circumstances from prevention is impossible.
 The neutral adjustment principle can be said to have a background 
with a similar structure with the principle of proportionality which seeks to 
readjust disproportionate sentencing, and for the latter, explanations based 
on the principle of proportionality functions properly as with the case of 
Ågren’s explanations.
9.? When some time has already passed from the 
date of the criminal act
 When there has been a ridiculously long time since the occurrence of 
the actual crime, this may become a mitigating circumstance.
 Ågren divides this circumstance into two types of situations16; firstly, 
when there has been a long time between the actual occurrence of the 
crime and the start of lawsuit, and secondly, when there has been a long 
time between the start of lawsuit and the conclusion of the lawsuit. The 
former case calls for mitigation because the necessity for penal diminishes 
as the penal value diminishes, and the latter does because it should be 
considered an “equity reason” for the stability of the law.
 In Japan, there has not been much discussion regarding the elapse of 
time, but it has been a topic of research. Its relationship with the statute of 
15 Ågren ?2013? s. 212 ff.
16 Ågren ?2013? s. 274.
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limitation, its decreased influence on society, and its influence on the 
defendant have been discussed, but these cases cannot be explained 
through prevention. Similar to Swedish law, this is appropriate and can be 
explained without associating it with prevention and placing the principle 
of proportionality at its foundation.
10.?Conclusion
 The principle of proportionality as a premise for equity reasons seems 
like a drastic claim similar to the “an eye for an eye” retribution and the 
absolute retributive theory, since it does not consider prevention and 
emphasizes penalties that is proportionate to the criminal act. However, 
the principle of proportionality is based on penalties consistent with formal 
justice?or penalties equivalent with penal value, as said in Sweden?and 
rejects subjective prevention theories that do not have any room for 
empirical testing, and by utilizing “equity reasons” based on “humanity” 
for revision, it enables the realization of penalties that is consistent with 
justice and is theoretically and practically a theory that is much more 
distinguished than Spilraumteorie.
 Further, the principle of proportionality is an easier concept to be 
understood by the general public, and may be instrumental in explaining 
sentencing standards to lay judges by professional judges. It also does not 
utilize prevention, which is a concept that lacks in empirical evidence, and 
thus avoids the unnecessary an inconclusive debate about the degree of 
sentencing that will definitively prevent future crimes.
 In Sweden, its criminal law stabilized after its provisions were revised 
by lay judges’ sentencing standards which were based on the principle of 
proportionality and equity reasons. There is great value in considering this 
method for future reference in countries where there are problems 
surrounding how sentencing standards should be set with the participation 
of lay judges. 
 There is a clear difference between Sweden and Japan, in that Swedish 
law has a provision where it verbalizes the principle of proportionality 
whereas Japan does not. In Sweden, sentencing inconsistent with the 
principle of proportionality is seen as illegal, but in Japan, even if the 
principle of proportionality was implemented, it would only be regarded as 
another example of interpretation. However, I believe there is great value 
12 Waseda Bulletin of Comparative Law Vol. 36
in familiarizing the principle of proportionality by suggesting to utilize a 
new standard for interpretation at the same time as showing and 
explaining to the judges the reality by organizing and pursuing the 
theoretical foundation of the principles of interpretation, even where there 
are no existing written provisions. 
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